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Although much has been written about the importance of leadership in the determination of organizational
success, there is little quantitative evidence due to the difficulty of separating the impact of leaders
from other organizational components – particularly in the public sector. Schools provide an especially
rich environment for studying the impact of public sector management, not only because of the hypothesized
importance of leadership but also because of the plentiful achievement data that provide information
on institutional outcomes. Outcome-based estimates of principal value-added to student achievement
reveal significant variation in principal quality that appears to be larger for high-poverty schools. Alternate
lower-bound estimates based on direct estimation of the variance yield smaller estimates of the variation
in principal productivity but ones that are still important, particularly for high poverty schools. Patterns
of teacher exits by principal quality validate the notion that a primary channel for principal influence
is the management of the teacher force. Finally, looking at principal transitions by quality reveals little
systematic evidence that more effective leaders have a higher probability of exiting high poverty schools.
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Estimating the Effect of Leaders on Public Sector Productivity:  
The Case of School Principals 
 
by Gregory F. Branch, Eric A. Hanushek, and Steven G. Rivkin 
   
I.  Introduction 
Leadership quality is often cited as key to organizational success across such 
diverse places as boardrooms, sports arenas, national legislatures, and schools. Yet it is 
often quite difficult to distinguish cause and effect, as those anointed as great leaders may 
simply have been in the right place at the right time. The standard analytical approach to 
investigating the importance of leaders, developed in the analysis of private firms, has 
concentrated on the outcomes – typically revenues or profits – associated with the top 
managers who have varying backgrounds or experiences.  But such an outcome-based 
approach requires an empirical model that effectively isolates the contribution of 
leadership from a variety of other, perhaps correlated, factors driving outcomes. 
Consideration of public sector leadership introduces special challenges because of the 
lack of market discipline and revenue and profit measures of outcomes. 
Analysis of the impact of CEOs on corporate results has a lengthy history, where 
a variety of methods have been used to infer impacts from the pattern of market returns to 
a company.
1   In an important recent paper, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide an 
innovative new approach.  Using semi-parametric methods with panel data to identify the 
effects of CEOs and top managers, they find that variation in the effectiveness of leaders 
explains a significant portion of the variance in profits and other outcomes. By 
simultaneously estimating both firm and manager fixed effects, the authors control for 
time-invariant differences among firms that could contaminate estimates of the variance 
in manager effectiveness.
2  
                                                 
1 There is an older literature with event studies on returns with changes in management (e.g., Johnson, 
Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985)).  Other work has looked the impact of management in family 
owned firms (see Bertrand (2009)) and at changes from firm founders (Bennedsen, Meisner Nielsen, Pérez-
González, and Wolfenzon (2007)).  Much of research on CEO performance has been motivated by 
investigations of CEO salaries (see, for example, Englmaier, Illing, and Sadka (2009) and the related 
symposium). 
2 However, changes over time in a variety of unobserved factors could inflate the estimated variance of 
manager behavior or productivity, even if the sample is limited to managers who work in at least two firms. 
Given the endogenous matching of firms and managers, there is a strong possibility that common 




A second strand of literature important for our analysis has focused on 
management practices at the plant level, recognizing that CEOs are far removed from 
much of the actual management activity.  Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) and related 
articles have documented the importance of differences in business and management 
practices across firms and countries by relating survey data to productivity differences.  
Their survey focuses on activities of plant managers in the manufacturing sector and 
attempts to describe key elements of management (such as the monitoring of employees 
or the provision of good hiring incentives).  They find these surveyed attributes to be 
correlated not only with firm performance but also with aggregate productivity at the 
national level.  It is at the same time not so much a direct study of the role and 
importance of managers as it is an investigation of management practices. 
In this paper we combine elements of both strands of work in an investigation of 
variation in the quality of management in education. We begin our investigation of 
performance at the “plant” level by using the same semi-parametric approach used in 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) to estimate the variance in principal effectiveness. We then 
extend the analysis in order to account more fully for the influences of time-varying 
unobservables by isolating the additional year-to-year fluctuation in outcomes that 
accompany changes in the principal. Following estimation of the variance in principal 
effectiveness, we investigate one widely discussed mechanism through which principals 
affect achievement: the management of teacher transitions. Importantly, because high 
teacher turnover can be associated with both improvement and decline in the quality of 
instruction, the level of turnover per se provides little information on the wisdom of 
principal personnel decisions. Therefore, we focus on the relationship between the quality 
of teachers who transition out of a school and the quality of principals. 
  Throughout the entire analysis, we are particularly interested in the assignment of 
principals to schools serving disadvantaged students. From case studies and anecdotal 
accounts, the importance of principals seems most apparent when considering schools 
serving disadvantaged populations. It is frequently asserted that high poverty schools are 
                                                                                                                                                 
who were profitable in their first positions may have more opportunities to gain employment at firms on the 
upswing in terms of profits due perhaps to a negative random shock in the prior period. Moreover, 
nonpersistent factors orthogonal to manager quality or behavior will inflate the variance of the estimated 
fixed effects, even if they do not bias the estimates of the impact of individual CEOs.  These are issues we 




hurt by being unable to attract and retain good principals. The demands of leading such 
schools, including the need to overcome less desirable working conditions in order to 
attract and retain high quality teachers, may amplify the importance of having an 
effective leader.
3 
The final component of the empirical analysis considers dynamics of the principal 
labor market.  Do the best principals tend to move away from high poverty schools?  
Since pay and career advancement in the public sector are often insulated from 
performance in ways different from private sectors, it is not possible simply to track the 
pay of principals.  Instead, we turn to a direct investigation of the quality of movers and 
stayers within schools, particularly those serving disadvantaged populations. 
 
II. The productivity of school leaders 
 
A dynamic and skilled school leader is frequently described as the key element of 
a high-quality school, and stories of the inspirational and effective principal are plentiful 
and oft-repeated.
4 The leadership and decision-making provided by a school principal is 
proximate and tied directly to outcomes in her school, unlike that of a school 
superintendent of a large district who operates more like a CEO in terms of providing 
broad policy guidance.  But there is no clarity from past work about what attributes might 
lead to success.
5 
A distinctive feature of this analysis is the focus on the public sector.
6  Unlike 
private industry, public institutions do not necessarily have a well-defined objective 
function, complicating the analysis of their behavior.  At the same time, with the advent 
of accountability systems under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and the complementary 
state systems, schools do have a direct incentive to maximize achievement on 
standardized tests. 
                                                 
3 Hanushek and Rivkin (2007), Boyd et al. (2011). 
4 A large qualitative literature focuses on “effective schools” and in that generally places special emphasis 
on principals and leadership issues.  See, for example, Edmonds (1979), Purkey and Smith (1983), or the 
case studies in Carter (2000). 
5 For some exploratory analysis of this, see Grissom and Loeb (forthcoming). 
6 One place where management has previously been considered in public employment is in welfare offices, 
but much of this has concentrated on the narrower question of how managers react to different incentives; 




In contrast to the traditional revenue and return focus of CEO and management 
studies, our study changes the performance measurement to student achievement. The 
advantage of this is that it insulates the study from exogenous factors such as prices, 
aggregate economic fluctuations, or prior capital investment decisions.  However, test-
measurement error and other test-related issues introduce other complications that must 
be addressed. 
In broad terms, we take a generally agnostic view of the attributes of principals 
that are important and use school administrative data to concentrate on the more basic 
question of how important is variation in principal quality. Our administrative data, with 
very large longitudinal samples of principals and schools, provide a particularly rich 
source of information for the investigation of leadership effects, because they enable the 
direct estimation of productivity on the basis of contributions to student achievement. 
Most prior analysis of principal effectiveness has been qualitative, though a small 
number of papers examine the determinants of principal effectiveness and any links with 
the labor market. Brewer (1993) and Eberts and Stone (1988) find that specific principal 
characteristics are related to high school student achievement, though the limited set of 
covariates may fail to account for important factors that could introduce bias. Loeb, 
Kalogrides, and Béteille (forthcoming) look at how a school’s value-added is related to 
the movement of teachers and suggest that this relationship is likely to reflect a 
principal’s influence. 
Finally, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) investigate the link between principal salary 
growth and employment transitions on the one hand and principal effectiveness as 
measured by state accountability rating and achievement on the other. They find a 
positive relationship between salary and both accountability rating and student 
achievement. Nonetheless, the inclusion of just a limited set of student, school, and 
district controls leaves open the possibility that neither accountability rating nor student 
achievement provide a meaningful measure of principal effectiveness because of the 
contributions of unobserved student, family, peer and school factors.  
Our central objective is to gain a better understanding of the overall impact and 
importance of principals, a fundamental issue for education policy. We do this in two 




estimate models that include both principal and school fixed effects and use the principal 
fixed effects to generate estimates of the variance in principal effectiveness. Second, we 
generate lower-bound estimates of the variance in principal effectiveness from the 
relationship between year-to-year variation in school achievement and principal 
transitions (following the general approach used by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)). 
This second approach accounts for some of the year-to-year fluctuations in achievement 
that inflate variance estimates based on principal fixed effects but that are not caused by 
principals. Nonetheless, even the second approach may be vulnerable to biases 
introduced by unobserved factors. Therefore, we take a number of steps to mitigate any 
bias and examine the robustness of the results in both estimation frameworks.  We also 
validate the estimates by assessing the impact of principal quality on decisions about 
teachers. 
 
 III. The Texas Database       
The administrative data used in this project were constructed as part of the UTD 
Texas Schools Project.  Working with the Texas Education Agency (TEA), this project 
has combined different data sources to create matched panel data sets of students, 
teachers, and principals. The panels include all Texas public school teachers, 
administrators, staff, and students in each year, permitting accurate descriptions of the 
schools for each principal. 
The Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS), TEA’s 
statewide educational database, reports key demographic data including race, ethnicity, 
and gender for students and school personnel as well as student eligibility for a 
subsidized lunch.  PEIMS also contains detailed annual information on teacher and 
administrator experience, salary, education, class size, grade, population served, and 
subject. Importantly, this database can be merged with information on student 
achievement by campus, grade, and year. Beginning in 1993, the Texas Assessment of 




grades three through eight.
7  These criterion referenced tests, which assess student 
mastery of grade-specific subject matter, are merged with the student and personnel 
information.  Reading and math tests each contain approximately 50 questions, although 
the number of questions and average percent correctly answered varies across time and 
grades.  We transform all test results into standardized scores with a mean of zero and 
variance equal to one for each subject, grade, and year, implying that our achievement 
measures describe students by their relative position in the overall state performance 
distribution. 
The personnel data combine time as a teacher and as an administrator into total 
experience, so it is not possible to measure tenure as a principal accurately for those who 
begin their principal career prior to the initial year of our data (the 1990/91 school year). 
Therefore, for both the descriptive analysis and the achievement modeling we concentrate 
on the period 1995-2001, and we allocate principals to precise experience and tenure 
categories in the early career while aggregating experience for six or more years.
8 
One of the strengths of our sample is the large number of principals and schools 
that are observed.  Over the 1995-2001 period we observe 7,420 unique principals that 
yield 28,147 annual observations of principals.  The large samples provide the 
opportunity to investigate differences by the poverty level of the school. 
 
IV. Principal transitions 
  Our estimation relies on changes in school outcomes that come with a change in 
principal.  Therefore, it is important to understand the extent and character of principal 
turnover.  Moreover, these principal moves are important in their own right. In parallel to 
concerns about teacher turnover, instability of leadership is often cited as a detriment to 
school improvement in high poverty and lower performing schools.
9  
                                                 
7 Many special education and limited English proficient students are exempted from the tests. In each year 
roughly 15 percent of students do not take the tests, either because of an exemption or because of repeated 
absences on testing days.  
8 Note that the achievement tests in Texas were changed in 2002, thus making comparison of results over 
time difficult. 
9 Teachers been shown to have preferences for the income, race, and achievement composition of students 
along with geographic locations; see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2005), Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2007).  Some evidence of similar preferences for 




  We begin by describing the distribution of principals by job tenure and the pattern 
of transitions with specific attention to differences by school poverty share and 
mathematics achievement. Schools with a high proportion low income students (those 
eligible for a subsidized lunch) are more likely to have first year principals and less likely 
to have principals who have been at the school at least six years than those with a less 
disadvantaged population (Table 1).
10  Nonetheless, the division of schools by initial 
achievement produces much larger differences. The proportion of principals in their 
initial year with a school is roughly 40 percent higher in schools with the lowest average 
initial achievement than those with the highest average initial achievement; the 
proportion of principals that have been at their current school at least six years is roughly 
50 percent higher in the highest achievement schools. Differences are also far smaller 
when ordered by the black or Hispanic enrollment share (not shown). 
  Table 2 reports annual principal transitions categorized by destination, new role, 
and tenure. Thirty percent of principals in our sample leave their school each year 
regardless of tenure in the school (compared to 20 percent nationally in 2009).
11  Perhaps 
more surprising, between 1 in 5 and 1 in 6 principals annually exit the Texas public 
schools, and the probability of exit does not vary much by tenure.
12 The probability of 
changing schools and remaining a principal rises from 5.9 percent following the first year 
at a school to 8.3 percent following the third through fifth years prior to falling back to 
5.7 percent for those with tenures of at least six years. By comparison, the probability of 
transitioning to a non-principal role at a campus declines from 4.5 percent to 2.8 percent 
as tenure increases from one to at least six years. For those with at least two years of 
tenure approximately 2 percent make a transition to work as district administrators. 
                                                 
10 Nationally in 2009, principal departures from a school are virtually identical for schools that did and did 
not participate in the free or reduced-price lunch program (Battle (2010)).   Gates et al. (2006) find similar 
higher mobility in disadvantaged schools in North Carolina.  As noted earlier the administrative data we 
use combine years as a principal with years spent in other roles including teaching. Therefore, there is no 
information on tenure as a principal beyond the years observed in the sample. 
11 See Battle (2010). 
12 Note that limiting the sample to principals with no more than 25 years of experience in order to lessen the 




V. Fixed-effects Estimates of the Variation in Principal Effectiveness 
  The fundamental identification challenge is the separation of the contribution of 
principals from other factors that drive student achievement.  In this section we describe 
the value-added model used to estimate principal fixed effects and the results of that 
estimation. Estimates are produced for a series of specifications and samples in order to 
examine the sensitivity of the variance estimates to potential confounding factors 
including test measurement error and issues surrounding test construction.   
A.  Empirical model 
  Our basic value-added model relates achievement (A) for student i in school s 
with principal p in year y to prior achievement, observed student characteristics (X), time 
varying school and peer characteristics (C), and a vector of principal-by-school fixed 
effects ().
13 Adding a random error (ε), the basic empirical model is:  
(1) 
1 iy iy iy sy sp iy AA XC        
 
       The concern of course is that other unmeasured factors will be correlated with the 
principal in each school and with the principal’s effectiveness.  One fundamental 
alternative to equation (1) is to add a vector of school fixed effects () – implying that the 
impact of principals is estimated entirely on the within-school variation in achievement 
through comparing student performance when different principals run each school.  This 
approach guards against systematic selection of the schools by students and principals, 
but it also puts extra strain on the data.  Below, we consider both equation (1) and the 
expansion to include the school fixed effects. 
  In the empirical application, the vector X includes a full set of race and ethnicity 
indicators and indicators for subsidized lunch eligibility, special education participation, 
female and English as a second language.  It also includes indicators for school changes: 
a switch to the earliest grade offered in a different school (including structural transitions 
from elementary to middle school) and a switch to other than the earliest grade offered in 
                                                 
13 While the general concept has been used in education for over three decades (see Hanushek (1979)), the 
recent addition of extensive administrative data bases has led to expansion of both the empirical analysis 
(Hanushek and Rivkin (2010b)) and the understanding of fundamental underlying estimation and 




a new school. The vector C of time-varying aggregate influences includes average 
demographic characteristics for students in school s in year y including proportion low 
income, proportion classified as special needs, proportion that are new entrants to the 
school and proportion female. All regressions also include a full set of year-by-grade 
indicators to account for test and other statewide policy changes.
14 
  As with related prior analyses of value-added for teachers, the lagged 
achievement term is included to capture past inputs from families, schools, and peers 
along with overall ability differences. This formulation supports a focus on just the 
contemporaneous inputs that are related to student learning in year y. 
B.  Variance estimates based on three year spells 
   We begin with estimates of the variation in principal effectiveness from a sample 
restricted to the first three years a principal leads a school (similar to the approach taken 
by Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Because the impact of a principal on school quality 
likely increases with tenure given the persistence of personnel and other decisions, 
focusing on a sample of principals with the same tenure profile effectively controls for 
variation in quality related to differences in length of tenure. Importantly, principal 
impacts may become more positive or more negative over time, so simple linear or 
polynomial controls for tenure are not appropriate. On the one hand, over time a principal 
would be expected to learn about school operations, the effectiveness of various teachers, 
and other school specific factors, and such learning would presumably improve job 
performance. On the other hand, however, principal personnel decisions alter the stock of 
teachers and the school environment, and the impact of a principal increases over time as 
a principal accounts for more and more of the hiring and retention of the existing stock of 
teachers.  





th percentiles of the 
principal-by-spell fixed-effect distribution disaggregated by the school poverty rate.  
From the first column, we find that the overall standard deviation of principal 
effectiveness is estimated to be 0.207.  This is a very large effect – perhaps unbelievably 
                                                 
14For the actual estimation, the data are aggregated prior to running the regressions to the campus-by-grade-
by-year level to reduce the computational burden.   All tables report absolute values of t-statistics based on 




large – because it implies that a principal one standard deviation above the mean would, 
compared to an average principal, move mean achievement from the 50
th percentile to the 
58
th percentile in one academic year.  This impact is seen vividly by moving across the 
given percentiles for all teachers:  a principal in the top quarter of the distribution gets 
average school gains of 0.11 s.d., while one in the bottom quarter has losses of 0.15 s.d..
15 
  Looking down the first column reveals a monotonic relationship between the 
school poverty rate and the estimated variance. The variance in principal effectiveness 
increases noticeably with the share of low income students in the school. An examination 
of the achievement impacts at various quantiles of the principal quality distribution shows 
that the increase in dispersion as the poverty level rises is most pronounced at the lower 
end of the principal quality distribution: The difference in the effectiveness of the 
principal between the least and most disadvantaged school equals -0.20 standard 
deviations at the 10
th percentile, -0.17 standard deviations at the 25
th percentile, but only 
0.07 standard deviations at the 90
th percentile.   
  It is tempting to conclude that the best principals are quite evenly distributed 
across schools while the weakest principals are disproportionately found in high poverty 
schools.  Note, however, that we cannot distinguish between two, quite different 
explanations for this pattern.  High poverty schools may draw a disproportionate share of 
the overall least effective principals; or, the least effective principals may be evenly 
distributed but the adverse effect of low-productivity principals is larger in the most 
disadvantaged schools. 
C.  Test Measurement Issues 
The interpretation of these estimates is, nonetheless, complicated further by 
potential test measurement issues. Not only can test measurement error and school 
differences in the skill distribution of students – the two major issues to be discussed 
below – contaminate the variance estimates, but these effects may differ systematically 
by poverty level. 
                                                 
15 Note that the median principal produces slightly negative average gains.  This is a specific subset of 
principals – those in their first three years of tenure in the school – and they are not far different from what 




Existing research on teacher quality confirms the special measurement issues 
arising in the study of achievement test results.  Because the measurement of principal 
effectiveness is based on student assessments, both the structure of tests and errors in test 
measurement potentially complicate the estimation of principal quality.
16 First, as Kane 
and Staiger (2002) and Jacob and Lefgren (2005, (2006) point out in other contexts, even 
in the absence of confounding influences, test-based quality estimates capture both 
random error and true effects. Consequently variance estimates overstate the actual 
variation in principal effectiveness, and the magnitude of any upward bias is likely to 
increase as school size decreases. Following Morris (1983) we utilize a shrinkage 
estimator to mitigate the impact of the test error. Normalizing average principal quality to 
zero, the adjusted quality estimate   for principal p equals 
(2)    
where   is the estimated fixed effect for principal p,   is the average fixed effect for 
all principals, Vp is the estimated variance of the fixed-effect estimate for principal p, and 
A is the estimate of the overall variance. Essentially, the shrinkage estimator pulls 
estimates toward the grand mean; the larger the error variance the more the adjusted fixed 
effect is shrunk toward the grand mean. 
  Second, the construction of the test may affect the translation of measured student 
achievement into principal quality when differences in the achievement distribution exist 
across schools. For example, in schools where many students score near the top of the 
test at the beginning of the school year such that test ceiling effects become binding, 
principal quality might have very little effect on standardized test scores even if the 
principal is having substantial impact on the overall level of intellectual engagement and 
quality of instruction in the school.  This is particularly relevant for the TAAS scores that 
we rely upon for our analysis, because the test is focused on lower level skills, and high 
achieving students could do very well on this test even without attending school. 
Consequently our test score-based-estimates of principal quality may produce a more 
                                                 
16 Test measurement errors include both issues of reliability and of validity.  Reliability encompasses 
whether a test will consistently yield the same score for a given domain, while validity focuses on how well 


















compressed distribution for groups of schools with larger shares of initially high 
achieving students. Because we are particularly interested in the possibility that principals 
may have larger effects in schools serving predominantly disadvantaged students who 
tend to have lower initial scores, producing valid comparisons across schools grouped by 
poverty rate requires that this concern be addressed. 
We investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to student composition using two 
alternative methods. The simplest incorporates a more flexible specification of prior 
achievement in order to capture differences in expected test score growth by initial score. 
Preliminary results (not reported) showed that polynomial terms for initial achievement 
had little effect on the estimates of principal effectiveness. However, the inclusion of 
quadratic or cubic terms may not fully address the problem given the skewness of the test 
score distribution.  
Our preferred method is to weight performance by fixed weights in order to 
produce estimates of principal quality not influenced by differences in the test score 
distribution among schools.  In particular, most schools have a mixture of students 
performing at different achievement levels, and it is the varying proportions that signify 
“advantaged” or “disadvantaged” in an achievement sense.  Equation (3) shows the 















where  d F  is the fixed weight share for test decile d,  sgyd share  is the actual share of 
students in school s in grade g in year y in decile d, N is enrollment, A is test score, and i 
indexes child. For this, we normalize scores on schools serving poverty students.  The 
weights come from the distribution of 3
rd grade mathematics achievement scores in 1994 
for students in the top quartile of schools in terms of proportion of students eligible for a 
subsidized lunch. F1 is the share in the bottom test score decile, F2 in the second decile, 
and on up to F10 in the top decile. The scores of students at the low end of the distribution 
receive disproportionate weight in schools with small shares of such students relative to 




less than proportional weight in schools with a high concentration of initially low 
achieving students. 
  Table 4 presents three sets of estimates for all schools combined that address 
these two measurement issues separately and then together. The top panel reproduces the 
full-sample estimates from Table 3, the second panel contains information based on the 
estimates summarized in Table 3 but shrunk to the grand mean on the basis of the 
standard errors; the third panel reports the variance and quantiles for estimates of 
principal fixed effects based on value-added estimates of reweighted data that eliminate 
differences in the distribution of initial achievement among principals; finally, the bottom 
panel reports results based on reweighted data that have been shrunk to remove the 
effects of test error. Note that separate estimates by poverty quartile (not reported) follow 
the pattern of change found in the full sample. 
  The similarity between the results in the top two panels shows that shrinkage has 
virtually no effect on the estimated distribution of principal quality. Unlike estimates of 
teacher value-added that often rely on fewer than 15 observations for many teachers, 
estimated value-added for principals even in quite small schools typically come from at 
least several hundred test scores. Consequently the variance of the error is likely to be 
quite small, and it is not surprising that shrinkage has little effect on the results. 
  In contrast, there are marked differences among schools in the initial achievement 
distribution, and this raises the possibility that the greater concentration of test scores at 
the lower end of the achievement distribution causes the larger variance in principal 
quality observed for high poverty schools. Re-weighting the scores such that the 
estimates for all principals are based on the same underlying distribution among student 
test score deciles lessens this concern. However, it does potentially increase the error 
variance by placing greater weight on smaller cells, and this may have a particularly large 
effect in very high and very low poverty schools 
Consistent with the notion that re-weighting increases the error variance, the use 
of the shrinkage estimator has a much larger effect on the re-weighted data. Nonetheless, 
after shrinking, the variance estimates of the reweighted data (bottom panel) remain 
larger than those generated from the unweighted data (second panel), suggesting that test 




Yet because of the possibility that reweighting could exacerbate unobserved influences 
for students in small cells, we use unweighted data in the remainder of the analysis in 
order to avoid overstating the variation in principal effectiveness. 
D.  School Fixed-Effect Estimates 
  The prior estimates show substantial variation in principal value-added, but 
questions remain as to whether unobserved factors confound these estimates. If some 
salient differences among schools (that are not under the control of the principal) are not 
accounted for, estimates of  combine true principal effects with unobserved differences 
in other school or student factors. To understand the potential for such bias, we include 
school fixed effects () in the specifications. This eliminates the influence of time-
invariant school differences at the cost of restricting principal comparisons to others who 
lead the same school. But, as a result, the estimated variance of the school fixed-effect 
estimates of principal quality omits all between school variation in principal 
effectiveness, potentially underestimating variations in principal quality. 
  Importantly, the restriction of the sample to the first three years in a school is not 
feasible in school fixed-effects models that identify principal effectiveness on the basis of 
within-school achievement differences, because the numbers of schools with two 
principals observed in their first three years is quite small.  Therefore, in the fixed-effects 
models we consider the full sample and do not control for years at the school, although 
we do examine the effects of introducing controls for the first year of a spell. 
Table 5 reports variance estimates from models with and without school fixed 
effects (with the latter estimates introduced to allow for potential differences due to 
sample composition). The first column shows that estimates are very similar to the 
comparable estimates in Table 4 for the sample restricted to the first three years at a 
school even though they include the wider range of tenure. But, the second column shows 
that the inclusion of the school fixed effects substantially reduces the variation in 
estimated principal quality.  
In both the separate poverty categories and for the sample taken as a whole, the 
inclusion of school fixed effects reduces the estimated variance of principal quality by 





confounding factors, some of it also likely reflects the elimination of real between-school 
variation in principal effectiveness. Looking down the second column, we see that the 
variance in effectiveness still increases monotonically with poverty concentration.  In 
fact, the relative increase in the variance of effectiveness is noticeably larger when 
looking at just within-school variation. 
  The overall estimate of the variance of principal effectiveness from within-school 
variance, while smaller than the previous estimates, remains substantial.  It indicates that 
a one standard deviation increase in principal effectiveness raises school average 
achievement by slightly more than 0.1 s.d, a magnitude roughly comparable to the 
estimates of the within-school variance in teacher quality. 
 
VI.  Direct Estimation of a Lower Bound on the Variance in Principal 
Effectiveness 
  The previous estimates of the distribution of principal quality began with 
estimation of the impact of individual principals and used these to understand what the 
overall distribution looks like.  Although unobserved factors that are orthogonal to 
principal quality do not bias estimates of individual principal effectiveness, they do 
inflate the estimates of the variance in principal quality (and were the subject of various 
corrections). An alternative approach focuses on how the variance in achievement growth 
changes across student cohorts as new principals assume leadership in a school.  From 
this, it is possible to estimate the variance in principal effectiveness directly and in so 
doing to circumvent some of the complications of the prior estimation.
17 
  We begin with a modified version of the basic achievement equation from 
equation (1), where we aggregate across the students in a school to get the average 
achievement gain.
18   Equation (4) relates the average gain in achievement in school s in 
year y to principal quality (), the quality of other school factors including student 
composition not under the control of the principal (δ), a school fixed effect (γ), and the 
school average error that includes unobserved student influences: 
                                                 
17 This approach is similar to that in Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), which identified teacher quality 
impacts through the movement of teachers in and out of schools. 
18 For ease of presentation, this depiction restricts the coefficient on lagged achievement to equal 1; family 
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Consider the difference between successive years y and  ' y  in average gains in 
achievement.  This eliminates all school effects that do not vary across the two years, leaving 
only year-to-year differences in principal quality, other school influences, and other unobserved 
time-varying factors as determinants of the difference in achievement gain. 
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Squaring this difference yields a natural characterization of the observed achievement 
differences between years as a series of terms that reflect the variances and covariances of the 
principal and other school effects plus a catchall component e that includes all random error and 
cross-product terms between specific principal and other year-specific effects.  
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Taking the expectation of Equation 6 and assuming principals are drawn from common 
distributions over the restricted time period of the observations yields: 
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    is the variance of principal quality and   ' yy     is the covariance in principal quality 
across the two years.   Similarly, 
2
   and  ' yy    are the variance and covariance other school 
influences across years, again assumed to come from a common distribution. 
  Our focus is on the term  '
2 () yy      that characterizes the influence of principal 
quality on squared changes in school-average achievement growth.  Specifically, we 
relate principal turnover to the difference between the variance and covariance terms by 
regressing the squared difference in achievement gain on a dummy variable indicating 
that a school has a different principal in years y and y’. The parameter on that dummy 
variable would be equal to two times the variance in principal quality under three key 
assumptions: 1) the effect of a principal is fixed (no change over time); 2) principals are 
assigned randomly to schools; and 3) principal turnover is orthogonal to other school 




  This interpretation comes directly from these three assumptions. In schools with 
the same principal for years y and y’, the variance and covariance terms are equal and the 
principal contributes nothing to the variation in achievement gain. In schools with 
different principals in years y and y’, the covariance term is zero (under assumption 2), 
and the principal contributes 
2
   to the year-to-year difference in achievement gain as 
shown in Equation (7). 
  Violation of the first assumption would almost certainly bias downward the 
estimate of the variance in principal quality. In our framework any contributions of an 
incumbent principal to year-to-year differences in school quality would be incorporated 
into the counterfactual squared difference in achievement gain attributed to factors other 
than the principal. If ignored, such changes will bias downward estimates of principal 
effects based on the coefficient for the different principal dummy. Because any such 
changes are most likely to occur in the initial years in a school, we include a dummy 
variable indicating that a difference is calculated over the first two years of a principal 
spell in some specifications. 
Similarly, violation of the second assumption would also bias downward the 
estimate of the variance in principal quality. If individual schools tended to draw 
principals from a particular part of the quality distribution because of their salary 
structure, quality of central administration, or other factors, the covariance term will be 
positive rather than zero in schools with different principals in years y and y’. This would 
again reduce the difference in the expected value of  '
2 () yy    
  between schools with 
different principals and schools with the same principals and thus attenuate the variance 
estimate. Essentially our approach ignores all between school variation in principal 
effects, because they cannot be identified. 
In contrast, violation of the third assumption could potentially bias upward the 
coefficient on the different principal dummy variable. A range of shocks including 
changes in student demographics could increase both the probability of principal turnover 
and amplify fluctuations in achievement between cohorts. Therefore, it is imperative to 
account directly for variation over time in student characteristics that could be related to 




sensitivity of the estimate to the inclusion of significant time varying factors provides 
information on the likely existence and strength of unobserved factors that might 
confound the estimate.
19 
The sensitivity of the turnover coefficient to the period over which we calculate 
the squared differences also provides information on the validity of the estimates. Given 
the likely increase over time in the impact of a new principal, we would expect smaller 
principal turnover coefficients for specifications using squared differences in gains for 
adjacent years straddling the transition than for specifications using squared differences 
for non-adjacent years with a one year gap (e.g. 1999 and 1997 versus 1998 and 1997). 
The opposite finding of larger turnover coefficients for adjacent years would suggest the 
presence of additional turbulence around principal transitions and raise doubts about the 
validity of the estimates. 
  Table 6 reports the different lower-bound estimates of the variation in principal 
effectiveness, depending on the comparison group and different controls for student 
demographics.  The estimates consider both adjacent and non-adjacent-year variances 
and the inclusion of first year principal indicators.  The different-principal coefficient is 
positive and highly significant in all specifications, consistent with the existence of 
significant variation in principal quality. Note that the inclusion of an indicator for 
observations that span the first two years of a principal spell increases only slightly the 
estimated variance (compare Columns 2 and 3 and Columns 5 and 6). 
  More importantly, the pattern of estimates provides support for the interpretation 
of the results as capturing the variation in principal effects. First, the non-adjacent-year 
specifications (col. 4-6) produce estimated standard deviations of principal effects that 
are roughly 10 percent larger than the comparable adjacent-year specifications. This is 
consistent with an increase over time in the influence of new principals and not consistent 
with the hypothesis that other changes or shocks coincident to the principal turnover bias 
upward the estimate of the variance in principal effects. 
  Second, the lack of sensitivity of the different-principal coefficient to the 
exclusion of the highly significant set of demographic characteristics suggests that neither 
                                                 
19 Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) describe an informal approach to measuring the bias from unobserved 




observed nor unobserved factors inflate the estimates of the variation in principal 
effectiveness. Comparisons of Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 4 and 5 show that the 
exclusion of these variables has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the different-
principal coefficient.  As a result, we interpret these estimates as lower bounds on the 
variance in principal effectiveness. 
  Although roughly half as large as the fixed-effects estimates, these magnitudes for 
the lower bound remain educationally significant. A one standard deviation increase in 
principal quality translates into an increase of roughly 0.05 standard deviations in average 
student growth. By comparison, within-school estimates suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher quality raises achievement by somewhat more than 0.1 
standard deviations.
20  However, teachers affect only their students, while principals 
affect all students in a school. Therefore, the overall impact from moving across the 
principal quality distribution substantially exceeds the benefit from a comparable 
movement across the teacher quality distribution.  
Table 7 reports different principal coefficients for both the adjacent-year and 
interrupted-year specifications by poverty quartile. All coefficients are positive, though 
only those for the third poverty quartile reach significance at the five percent level. 
Nonetheless, although much noisier, the pattern of estimates mirrors that observed in 
previous tables: the lower-bound for the variance in principal quality increases 
monotonically with the poverty share. 
Taking both the fixed-effect and the direct-estimation approaches together, three 
main findings emerge from the analysis: 1) there is significant variation in principal 
effectiveness; 2) variation increases with the school poverty share; and 3) the magnitude 
of the estimates falls substantially following the inclusion of school fixed effects and 
again following the focus on the additional variance associated with a change in 
principal. Although the latter finding is not definitive evidence that unobserved school 
differences bias estimates of principal effectiveness, the pattern of estimates is certainly 
consistent with this belief. Moreover, the findings indicate that sampling error introduces 
upward bias into the variance estimates. 
                                                 
20 Hanushek and Rivkin (2010b) review estimates of the within-school variance in teacher quality and find 
an average of 0.11 s.d. for reading and 0.15 s.d. for math.  The estimated benefits are similar to those of a 




Finally, the estimates in Tables 6 and 7 ignore any between-school variation in 
principal effects.  This suggests that the findings likely understate the actual variance in 
principal effects. 
 
VII. Principal Quality and Teacher Turnover 
The prior estimates rely on indirect measures of principal impact, namely student 
learning gains during a principal’s tenure in a school.  It does not include any 
observations about what a principal actually does to improve or limit learning.  In part to 
validate the prior estimates of principal effectiveness, we turn to the interactions of 
principals with teaching staff.  This additional investigation, however, also bears directly 
on a number of current policy discussions.  
A primary channel through which principals can be expected to improve the 
quality of education is by raising the quality of teachers either through improving the 
instruction by existing teachers or through teacher transitions that improve the caliber of 
teaching (see, for example, Loeb, Kalogrides, and Béteille (forthcoming)). Teacher 
turnover per se has been subject to considerable policy attention, given the well-known 
difficulties experienced by new teachers. However, the benefits of reducing turnover 
clearly depend on both the composition of entering and exiting teachers and the transition 
rate. 
Because it is difficult to separate improvement in the quality of instruction by 
current teachers from other changes that raise achievement, we focus on teacher 
turnover.
21 We expect highly rated principals to be more successful at retaining more 
effective teachers and moving out less effective teachers. In contrast, we expect less 
highly rated principals to be less successful in raising the quality of the teaching stock, 
because of less skill in evaluating teacher quality, less emphasis on teacher effectiveness 
in personnel decisions, or less success at creating an environment that is attractive for 
better teachers. Although better principals may also attract and hire more effective 
                                                 
21 The estimation of teacher quality has been an active area of research, particularly in terms of value-added 
models.  See, for example, Hanushek and Rivkin (2006, (2010b), Rothstein (2010), and McCaffrey, Sass, 
Lockwood, and Mihaly (2009).  One result from this research is clarity about the difficulty of estimating 
teacher effectiveness with small samples of students, and this makes it difficult to identify the impact of 




teachers, the absence of quality measures for new teachers and the fact that many 
principals may have little control over new hires lead us to focus specifically on turnover. 
Unfortunately, our data do not contain information on personnel decisions that 
would enable us to separate voluntary and involuntary transitions, and existing evidence 
suggests that teachers rather than principals initiate the majority of transitions. In 
addition, the Texas administrative data do not match students and teachers, meaning that 
we must draw inferences about teacher quality from grade average information. Although 
this avoids problems introduced by non-random assignment to classrooms that potentially 
biases estimates of teacher value-added (see Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) and 
Rothstein (2010)), it prevents direct comparisons of the quality of individual stayers and 
leavers. An alternative, however, that we pursue below is to focus on the aggregate 
mobility patterns. 
A.  The magnitude of teacher turnover 
Teacher turnover has been a significant concern, especially in high poverty 
schools (see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) and Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2005)).
22 Prior to examining the relationship between principal quality and the 
pattern of teacher exits, we describe variation in the magnitude of teacher turnover by 
principal quality and school poverty. 
Figure 1 shows that the teacher transition rate is highest in schools with the least 
effective principals, regardless of the rate of school poverty. This pattern is consistent 
with concerns about working conditions being a primary contributor to exits (see, for 
example, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), Hanushek and Rivkin (2007)). However, 
in the remaining three categories, there is little difference in overall turnover, with the 
exception of the highest poverty schools in which turnover in the 2
nd quartile of principal 
quality is closer to the bottom quartile than the others. In fact turnover in the top principal 
quality schools is uniformly higher than that in the next category. 
Prior analyses of teacher turnover suggest that the quality of movers differs 
systematically by destination. Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, and Rivkin (2005) and 
Goldhaber, Gross, and Player (2011) both find that district-switchers tend on average to 
                                                 
22 For the quality dimension of teacher turnover, see Hanushek and Rivkin (2010a) and Goldhaber, Gross, 




outperform teachers moving within the district and those exiting the public schools 
entirely. Consistent with that finding and the importance of leadership, Figure 1 shows 
that it is the rate of departure to other districts that tends to be much higher in schools 
with the least effective principals and lower in schools with the most effective principals.  
In fact district switching decreases monotonically as principal quality rises in all four 
poverty categories and differences in the rate of district switching is consistent with 
higher quality principals losing a smaller share of their more effective teachers. 
B.  Principal quality and teacher selection 
With accurate information on teacher effectiveness and transitions, we could 
investigate whether better principals are more likely to dismiss the least effective teachers 
and reduce the probability that the more effective teachers depart voluntarily. In the 
absence of such information, however, we focus on the relationship within schools 
between the share of teachers that exit each grade and the grade-average value-added and 
observe how this varies with our estimates of principal quality. Specifically we 
investigate whether the relationship between the teacher exit rate in a grade and grade- 
average value-added is more negative in schools with higher quality principals.
23  
This is obviously an imprecise test of whether better principals are dismissing 
their least effective teachers or retaining their most effective, as small grade average 
differences in mean value-added provide imperfect information on the probability that 
there is a very low performing or very high performing teacher in one grade as opposed 
to another. Nonetheless, while there will be cases in which the lowest performer teaches 
in the grade with the higher average teacher quality and vice versa, a very low performer 
is more likely to teach in the grade with the lower average achievement, and a very high 
performer is more likely to teach in the grade with higher average achievement. 
  We therefore employ a generalized difference-in-differences approach to 
investigate the variation in the relationship between grade differences in the rate of 
teacher exit and average value-added by principal quality. Equation (8) relates teacher 
turnover (T) in grade g in school s following year y to estimated value-added in grade g, 
                                                 
23 Note that it is not necessary for our purposes that the good principals explicitly make decisions to dismiss 
poor teachers.  Teachers could be making these decisions based upon the atmosphere and actions of the 
principals (Boyd et al. (2011)) as long as the level of an influence over different quality teachers is 
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24 quartile of estimated principal quality (Qi), 
student characteristics (X), average value-added interacted with quartiles of estimated 
principal quality, and a vector of campus-by-year fixed effects. Note that the estimates of 
principal quality come from the analysis of principals’ first three years in a school 
(Section V.B, above). 
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Our primary interest is the relationship between principal quality and changes in the 
quality of the teaching force. If higher quality principals are more likely to succeed in 
retaining effective teachers and moving out ineffective teachers, we would expect 
432 0.     That is, we expect the grade differences in teacher turnover and average 
value-added to be more negatively related in schools with a higher quality principal. 
  The inclusion of school-by-year fixed effects fully accounts for all fixed and time-
varying unobserved differences between schools that raised such concern in the 
estimation of principal effectiveness. In this framework only variation between grades 
and within schools and years are used to identify the relationship between principal 
quality and the pattern of teacher exits. Therefore, we are able to use the more precisely 
estimated principal quality estimates based on the sample of principals in their first three 
years from a specification without school fixed effects. Note that the direct impacts of 
principal quality on the magnitude of teacher turnover (the  2 ' p s  ) are not separately 
identified, because principal quality does not vary within school and year. 
  An additional issue with the estimation of Eq. (8) is that it relies both on 
achievement measures that contain error but also on estimated parameters from prior 
stages (  and the  p Qs  ).  These measurement errors will tend to attenuate the estimates 
of interest. Before estimating equation (8), both the grade level value-added and principal 
quality estimates are shrunk toward the grand means of zero using Bayesian shrinkage 
estimation described above.  
                                                 
24 This measure of average test score gain is an approximation of grade value-added where   is the 




Table 8 reports estimates of our difference-in-differences model from 
specifications using the sample of all schools and the sample of schools in the highest 
poverty category.
25  As noted, the high poverty schools have the largest variance in 
principal quality and greatest rate of teacher turnover, elevating the concern about where 
the exiting teachers are drawn from in the school. 
The results in Column 1 reveal a negative relationship between teacher turnover 
and grade average value-added that increases monotonically as principal quality rises, 
though only the interaction with the top quartile of principals is statistically significant. 
This pattern is consistent with the belief that management of the stock of teacher quality 
constitutes an important pathway through which principals affect school quality. The 
results in Column 2 are similar for the sample of high poverty schools: all coefficients are 
negative but only the coefficient on the interaction with the top quartile of principals is 
statistically significant. 
Despite the aggregation to the grade level and reliance solely on the variation 
within school and year, the results provide strong evidence of more negative teacher 
selection out of a school in buildings run by highly effective principals, thus validating 
our prior quality estimates. In the absence of information on principal behavior and the 
proximate causes of each transition, it is not possible to know the precise actions that 
underlie the observed relationships. Nonetheless, it reinforces views about the importance 
of school leadership. 
 
VIII. The Quality Dimension of Principal Transitions 
  Many bemoan high rates of turnover for both teachers and administrators in 
schools with high concentrations of poverty. Yet, as noted, the magnitude of any turnover 
problem clearly depends on whether high or low quality personnel are leaving. No prior 
analysis has been able to describe systematically any differences that might exist in the 
mobility patterns of high- and low-quality principals. 
  In order to focus on this issue, we describe principal transitions following their 
third year in a school by principal quality and by the share of students eligible for a 
subsidized lunch. Following the taxonomy in the descriptive section above, principals are 
                                                 




observed to follow a variety of career moves: remaining in the same school as principal, 
remaining in the same school in another capacity, taking a principal position in another 
school, taking a different position in another school, moving to a central administrative 
position, or exiting the public schools entirely. Again principals are divided into four 
quality quartiles on the basis of estimates produced from the sample of the first three 
years in a school for specifications without school fixed effects. In this section the sample 
includes only principals with fewer than 25 years of total experience in order to minimize 
complications introduced by the retirement decision.
26   
As seen in Table 9, principals in the lowest quartile are least likely to remain in 
their current position and most likely to leave the public schools entirely.
27 With the 
exception of the lowest poverty schools, however, there is not a monotonic relationship 
between the probability of remaining in the same position and principal quality. 
Principals in both the second and third quartiles are substantially more likely to remain 
than those in the bottom quartile.  The most effective principals are always more likely to 
remain in the same position than those in the bottom quality quartile, but are generally 
more likely to move than those in the middle quality range.  Overall, the probability of 
exiting the public schools entirely moves as the mirror image of the probability of 
remaining in the same position. 
One troubling aspect of Table 9 from a policy perspective is the substantial share 
of low performing principals who transition to principal positions at other schools. This is 
particularly striking in the two highest poverty categories where over 12 percent of poor 
performers make such a move. In contrast, less than 7 percent of the poorest performers 
in the two lower poverty categories become principals at other schools.  This may reflect 
the fact that it is difficult to separate the difficulties of the school circumstances from the 
quality of the principal in high poverty schools – leading both the principals and the 
district administrators to give principals from high poverty schools another chance at a 
different school.   
                                                 
26 The experience restriction, however, has virtually no effect on the observed transition patterns.  
27 Because of the very small shares of principals that transition to other positions, Table 9 focuses on 
principal transitions to other schools and out of the public schools entirely. (Appendix Table a1 reports 




The simple conclusion, nonetheless, is that the operation of the principal labor 
market – constrained in a variety of ways by inertia in salaries, historical absence of good 
performance measures, and other restrictions in public sector operations – does not 
appear to screen out the least effective principals. Instead they frequently just move to 
different schools, perhaps reflecting the bargain necessary to move out an ineffective 
leader in a public sector organization. Potentially this is where the CEO (superintendent) 
enters.  A good superintendent may be good at decisions on retention and assignment of 
principals. We cannot directly look at this here, however, and this merits additional study. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
An important facet of many school policy discussions is the role of strong 
leadership, particularly of principals.  Leadership is viewed as especially important in 
revitalizing failing schools.  This discussion is, however, largely uninformed by 
systematic analysis of principals and their impact on student outcomes. More generally, 
assertions about the importance of leaders in many occupations and circumstances lack 
empirical backing. 
  Understanding the impact of principals on learning is a particularly difficult 
analytical problem. The non-random sorting of principals and students among schools, 
the varying evolution of principal influence with tenure, and other school changes over 
time complicate efforts to identify principal effectiveness. The fact that the magnitude of 
the estimated variance declines substantially following the inclusion of school fixed 
effects and again following the focus on the additional variance associated with a change 
in principal suggests that direct estimates of principal fixed effects combine real value-
added with sampling error and other influences.  
  Nonetheless, the lower bound results based on direct estimation from principal 
turnover – the most conservative of the alternative estimation approaches – suggest the 
existence of substantial variation in principal effectiveness. A principal in the top 16 
percent of the quality distribution (i.e., one standard deviation above average) will lead 
annually to student gains that are 0.05 s.d. or more higher than average for all students in 
the school. The finding that the variance increases with the school poverty rate is 




challenging schools and the hypothesis of larger variation in underlying skills of leaders 
entering high poverty schools – explanations that need not be mutually exclusive. 
There are many channels through which principals influence school quality, 
though the precise mechanisms likely differ among districts due to variation in the 
regulatory and institutional structures that define principal authority. Because all 
principals participate in personnel decisions, we focus on the composition of teacher 
turnover. For the best principals, teacher turnover is concentrated in the grades within 
their schools with lower value-added, supporting the belief that improvement in the stock 
of teacher quality provides an important channel through which principals can raise the 
quality of education. Moreover, this relationship is strongest in high poverty schools, 
consistent with the finding of larger variation in principal quality in these schools. 
  Finally, patterns of principal transitions indicate that it is the least and most 
effective that tend to leave schools, suggesting some combination of push and pull 
factors. This pattern is again particularly pronounced in higher poverty schools. A 
troubling finding on transitions shows that a substantial share of ineffective principals in 
high poverty schools take principal positions in other schools and districts. Much more 
needs to be learned about the dynamics of the principal labor market, just as much more 
needs to be learned about the underlying factors that contribute to teacher transitions. 
  We have emphasized the importance of variations in principal quality.  But, it is 
also worthwhile putting this analysis into the context of understanding the importance of 
managers in the public sector.  Recent work has emphasized the role of managers and 
leaders in profit making firms.  Several different approaches have been introduced.  One 
considers how important CEOs might be to differences in firm performance (Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003)).  The other goes into more depth about the specific managerial 
processes that promote higher performance (Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)). 
  Borrowing from both perspectives and moving into the public sector, we focus on 
plant-level (school) management and address the fundamental question of how big is the 
variation of quality of public managers.  In simplest terms, even with the constraints on 
public sector operations and the diffuse performance incentives, public sector managers 
appear to have a large impact on outcomes.  From a policy viewpoint, added attention to 
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Years of Principal Tenure    
 (percent)   
  1 2 3 4 5 
6 or 
more All 




lowest  17.8 15.3 12.6 10.2  8.2  36.1  100.0 
2nd  19.8 15.9 12.3  9.7  7.9  34.5  100.0 
3rd  20.5 17.1 13.7  9.7  7.9  31.1  100.0 
greatest  19.5 17.1 13.2 10.5  8.2  31.6  100.0 
           
mathematics 
achievement 
worst  22.7 19.4 14.3  9.8  7.4  26.3  100.0 
2nd  20.4 16.7 12.7 10.0  8.4  31.9  100.0 
3rd  18.1 15.3 12.5 10.1  7.9  36.3  100.0 







Years of tenure as principal at school 
(percent) 
Transition    1  2  3 to 5  6 or more
   
Remain principal        
    Same campus    72.5  68.0  69.2  70.8 
    New campus, same district    3.9  4.9  6.0  4.7 
    New district    2.0  2.5  2.3  1.0 
Other school job        
    Same campus    0.8  0.6  0.3  0.2 
    New campus, same district    2.0  2.1  2.2  2.1 
    New district    1.7  1.7  1.1  0.5 
Job in Administration        
   Same district central office    0.7  1.3  1.6  1.3 
   New district central office    0.5  0.7  0.7  0.4 
Exit Texas public schools    16.0 18.1 16.7 19.0 








    
 Average Annual School Achievement Growth 





Deviation  10th 25th 50th 75th 90
th 
  Lowest  0.158  -0.180  -0.063  0.032  0.134  0.215 
  2
nd  0.176  -0.243 -0.142 -0.032 0.086  0.190 
  3
rd  0.207  -0.301 -0.162 -0.036 0.103  0.207 
  Greatest  0.263  -0.383  -0.236  -0.068  0.114  0.285 
  All  0.207  -0.286  -0.153  -0.019  0.109  0.222 
 
Note:  Students are classified as low income if they are eligible for a subsidized lunch. 
The sample of principals includes all observations for principals in their first three years 
of tenure at a school. Principal value-added is measured by the principal fixed effect that 
comes from a regression of mathematics achievement on lagged achievement, principal 
demographic characteristics, student demographic characteristics, and measures of 










    
  Average Annual School Achievement Growth 
by Percentile of Principal Effectiveness 
 
Standard 
Deviation  10th 25th 50th 75th 90
th 
Unadjusted  0.207  -0.286 -0.153 -0.019 0.109  0.222 
Shrunk Estimates
a  0.200  -0.280 -0.150 -0.020 0.106  0.214 
Re-weighted 
Estimates
b  0.270  -0.182  -0.082 0.031 0.174 0.417 




0.241  -0.162  -0.071 0.032 0.164 0.385 
 
Note: The sample of principals includes all observations for principals in their first three 
years of tenure at a school. Principal value-added is measured by the principal fixed 
effect that comes from a regression of mathematics achievement on lagged achievement, 
principal demographic characteristics, student demographic characteristics, and measures 
of student mobility. Full grade-year controls are also included.  
a.   Bayesian shrinkage according to Eq. (2). 
b.  Weighting by testing deciles according to Eq. (3). 














With school fixed 
effects 
School Low-Income Share 
(quartile)   
 Lowest    0.179    0.077 
   2
nd   0.192    0.095 
   3
rd   0.230    0.118 
   Greatest    0.277    0.138 








  Adjacent-year difference  Interrupted-year difference 
   With  student  controls
a   With  student  controls
a 
        
Different  principal  0.0052 0.0048 0.0049 0.0058 0.0056 0.0058 
  (3.41) (3.16) (3.24) (4.35) (4.28) (2.87) 
        
Principal in 1st year     0.0036     0.0026 
     (2.97)     (2.72) 
Principal in 1st year*different 
principal        -0.0002 
        (0.11) 
N  27,767 27,767 27,767 23,232 23,232 23,232 
F test for student demographics
b    29.05 28.21    32.41 32.03 
Estimates derived from regression results 
     
Within-school variance of principal 
quality  0.0026 0.0024 0.0025 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 
Within-school standard deviation of 
principal quality  0.051 0.049 0.050 0.054 0.053 0.054 
Note:  Different-principal coefficients come from regressions of the year-to-year squared differences in school average student gains on an 
indicator for a different principal in the two comparison years. The absolute value of T-statistics are in parentheses.  
a.   Student controls include ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, limited English proficiency, special education status and student 
mobility measures (shares).  







  Poverty Quartile 



















Different Principal  0.0017  0.0015  0.0019  0.0024  0.0048  0.0066  0.0090  0.0081 
  (1.75)  (1.51)  (1.57)  (1.68)  (2.31)  (2.59)  (1.37)  (0.96) 
          
N 6,809  5,566  6,860  5,684  6,945  5,855  7,153  6,127 
           
Estimates derived from regression results 
    
Within-school variance of 
principal quality  0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 0.0024 0.0033 0.0045 0.0041 
Within-school standard 
deviation of principal 
quality 
0.029 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.049 0.057 0.067 0.064 
 
 
Note:  The different-principal coefficients come from regressions of year-to-year squared difference in school average student gains on an 
indicator for a different principal in the two comparison years. All regressions include the student demographic variables listed in Table 6 and 








  All schools  Highest poverty 
schools 
    
Grade-level value-added  ‐0.023 0.006
  (1.80) (0.33)
    
Grade-level value-added *2nd   ‐0.018 ‐0.065
quartile principal quality  (0.89) (1.79)
    
Grade-level value-added *3rd   ‐0.029 ‐0.025
quartile principal quality  (1.35) (0.65)
    
Grade-level value-added *4th   ‐0.079 ‐0.102
quartile principal quality  (3.68) (3.16)
   
 
Note: Principal quality is measured by principal fixed effect for principals in first three years (see 
Table 3).  The campus by year fixed-effect regressions (following Eq. (8)) also include the full set 
of student demographic variables. Regressions are weighted by enrollment.  The absolute value of 







      Quartile of principal quality
a 
 
Poverty Quartile and Principal 
Transition in Fourth Year  worst Q2 Q3 best
Lowest quartile low-income 
  Same campus, principal  58.6 68.0 73.5 76.3
  Moves campus, principal  4.6 4.1 4.6 4.3
  Moves district, principal  2.3 1.6 3.8 4.3
  Exit Texas Public Schools  27.6 21.3 12.1 8.6
Second quartile low-income 
  Same campus, principal  52.4 70.2 81.5 71.7
  Moves campus, principal  3.9 2.2 0.8 6.6
  Moves district, principal  1.0 6.0 2.4 5.7
  Exit Texas Public Schools  34.0 14.9 9.7 15.1
Third quartile low-income 
  Same campus, principal  44.4 55.3 63.8 58.1
  Moves campus, principal  7.5 5.7 9.5 8.1
  Moves district, principal  4.5 4.9 1.9 7.3
  Exit Texas Public Schools  35.3 25.2 19.1 23.4
 Highest Quartile low-income        
  Same campus, principal  62.6 73.2 72.3 67.4
  Moves campus, principal  8.6 11.0 6.9 7.3
  Moves district, principal  3.6 1.2 3.0 1.5
  Exit Texas Public Schools  21.6 12.2 15.9 21.0
          
  
Note: a. Principal quality from estimates for principals with three or less years of tenure in school 
(see Table 3). Transition status refers to the year subsequent to the third year in a school.  







      Quartile of principal quality
a 
 
Poverty Quartile and Principal 
Transition in Fourth Year  worst Q2 Q3 best
Bottom quartile low-income       
  Same campus, principal  58.6 68.0 73.5 76.3
  Same campus, other  1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0
  Moves campus, principal  4.6 4.1 4.6 4.3
  Moves campus, other  0.0 0.8 1.5 2.2
  Same district, distr. Admin  0.0 4.1 1.5 2.2
  Moves district, principal  2.3 1.6 3.8 4.3
  Move district, other  3.5 0.0 1.6 0.0
  Move district, district admin   2.3 0.0 0.8 2.2
 Exits  27.6 21.3 12.12 8.6
Second quartile low-income        
  Same campus, principal  52.4 70.2 81.5 71.7
  Same campus, other  1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Moves campus, principal  3.9 2.2 0.8 6.6
  Moves campus, other  2.9 0.8 0.8 0.9
  Same district, distr. Admin  1.9 0.8 1.6 0.0
  Moves district, principal  1.0 6.0 2.4 5.7
  Move district, other  1.9 3.7 2.4 0.0
  Move district, district admin   1.0 1.5 0.8 0.0
 Exits  34.1 14.9 9.7 15.1
Third quartile low-income        
  Same campus, principal  44.4 55.3 63.8 58.1
  Same campus, other  0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Moves campus, principal  7.5 5.7 9.5 8.0
  Moves campus, other  0.8 2.4 2.9 1.6
  Same district, distr. Admin  3.8 2.4 1.0 0.8
  Moves district, principal  4.5 4.9 1.9 7.3
  Move district, other  2.3 1.6 1.9 0.8
  Move district, district admin   0.8 2.4 0.0 0.0
 Exits  35.3 25.2 19.1 23.4
Top Quartile low-income        
  Same campus, principal  62.6 73.2 72.3 67.4
  Same campus, other  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Moves campus, principal  8.6 11.0 6.9 7.3
  Moves campus, other  0.7 1.2 1.0 1.5
  Same district, distr. Admin  0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
  Moves district, principal  3.7 1.2 3.0 1.5
  Move district, other  0.7 1.2 0.0 0.7
  Move district, district admin   2.2 0.0 0.0 0.7
 Exits  21.6 12.2 15.8 21.0
          
Note: a. Principal quality comes from estimates for principals with three or less years of tenure in 

















































Lowest Quartile Disadvantaged 2nd Quartile Disadvantaged
3rd Quartile Disadvantaged Highest Quartile Disadvantaged
Change School Change District
Exit Sample
Quartiles Principle Effectiveness